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Abstract  
Following the financial collapse in 2008 many commentators went onto 
pronounce the end of neoliberalism as a credible system for managing welfare 
state capitalism. The narrow economic belief in individuals as rational utility 
maximizers (the linchpin of neoliberal governance) was proved to be 
uncomfortably inaccurate. In light of these claims, British governments and 
think tanks have published various research and pol-icy documents promoting 
the use of soft forms of state power to ‘nudge’ citizens into behaving 
responsibly and rationally. Through an analysis of key policy documents and 
academic texts, I examine the repertoires and formulations informing this 
emerging governmental rationality (‘libertarian paternalism’) and draw 
together these perspectives to explore their effects in terms of framing policy 
understandings of the rational and the emotional. I conclude the article by 
utilizing a discursive psychology approach with the aim to problematize 
existing policy (mis)understandings of emotion as automated and unreflexive. 
 
Keywords: soft paternalism; neuroeconomics; emotion; politics; consumerism 
 
The death of neoliberalism? 
Until quite recently many commentators viewed neoliberalism as the 
dominant economic, political and intellectual framework shaping welfare state 
capitalism (Peck 2004, Brown 2005, Harvey 2005). Predicated on the ontology 
of markets, the efficacy of deregulation and a cutthroat rejection of command-
and-control economies, neoliberalism has successfully captured the 
imagination of governments on the left and right since the late 1970s/1980s. 
Since this time governments seeking to displace public, noncommercial powers 
and resources in favor of market-driven reform have adopted neoliberal 
discourse as its key legitimating narrative. Popularized through the slogan 
‘there is no alternative,’ neoliberalism stems from the insistence that public 
and private institutional arrangements and transactions are better organized 
through the prism of market calculation, when the intervention of state control 
and regulation is kept to a minimum (‘the minimalist state’). The period 1980–
present has subsequently been one in which social class has been eviscerated 
by its critics as a ‘zombie’ category (Beck 2001) and contrary to the ‘reality’ of 
really existing postmodern, consumer-driven, cosmopolitan societies. 
Alongside this populist forms of political representation have frustrated 
traditional party politics (Laclau 2005) and facilitated the rise of moderate, 
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‘progressive’ governments who are obsessed with marketization, consumerism 
and administration over politics (best captured through 
New Labour’s mantra ‘what matters is what works’). Through making the 
market ubiquitous and the consumer sovereign, neoliberal discourse thus 
carves out a privileged space for the standard economic assumption that all 
individuals are rational utility maximizers with ‘well-informed preferences 
which they can perceive, rank and compare easily’ (Dunleavy 1991, p. 3). The 
articulation of the figure of the ‘citizen-consumer’ in many government texts 
and speeches (Clarke et al. 2007) has come to signify the cooption and 
translation of these economic theories into a policy and political reality. 
 
Following the financial meltdown in 2008, however, a torrent of criticism was 
leveled against the narrow economic assumption that the self-interests of 
lending institutions such as mortgage companies necessarily lead them to act 
responsibly. Huge investments in ‘sub-prime’ mortgages at the time (loans 
made available to people who do not qualify for market interest rates) 
produced a devaluation of US real estate pricing so severe that financial 
institutions collapsed, investor confidence receded, credit tightened and 
international trade declined. The global capitalist system was brought to its 
knees (only to be later revived by taxpaying publics). As we shall see, the 
financial meltdown was represented as a crisis both at the level of markets – a 
‘crisis of neoliberalism’ (Beder 2009) – and as a crisis stemming from the 
pathological behavior of erratic and impulsive individuals, in other words, a 
crisis of individual rationality (Davies 2012). 
 
Addressing a Senate Committee in October 2008, Alan Greenspan, the former 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, conceded ‘I made a mistake in presuming 
that the self-interests of organizations, specifically banks and others, were 
such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and 
their equity in the firms’ (Greenspan cited in Clark and Treanor 2008). In the 
UK Shadow Chancellor George Osborne together with behavioral economist 
Richard Thaler (2010) offered up a similar diagnosis, arguing that ‘the crisis has 
finally put to rest the assumption, which underpinned Labour’s entire system 
of financial regulation, that individual behaviour is always entirely ratio-nal.’ 
Other commentators even went so far as to pronounce the end of 
neoliberalism. Will Hutton (2008) declared in The Observer that the policy 
responses to the financial crisis reflected a Keynesian style ‘managed 
capitalism’ while Peter Wilby writing in the New Statesman (2009) passionately 
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argued: ‘[t]he promises of neoliberalism are revealed for what they were: a 
sham. An ideology that seduced most of the population is broken.’ But is 
neoliberalism broken or is the situation more complex than this? Is 
neoliberalism undergoing a process of translation or reconfiguration, for 
example? And if so, what are the political forces and articulating practices 
underpinning these chains of connection and strategies of colonization? In 
response to these issues I explore the governmentality of libertarian 
paternalism as a continuation of neoliberalism by other means. More 
specifically, I explain the effects of libertarian paternalism in terms of 
informing and shaping policy translations of the rational and the emotional. 
 
The birth of libertarian paternalism 
As a model for financial planning and regulation, neoliberalism today appears 
less domi-nant. Following the financial crisis, the coalition government 
introduced huge restrictions on welfare spending and the financial sector of 
the economy to comply with the proposed austerity measures needed to 
tackle the recession, and even nationalized certain financial intermediaries. But 
as a political and intellectual project that suffered little reprisal sub-sequent to 
the crisis, other than a wag of the finger at bankers, neoliberalism is certainly 
far from finished. In the realm of welfare it is business as usual. Choice and 
competition endure as framings for steering public sector organization and 
summoning active citizens. 
 And then there is the nature of public accountability itself. Mechanisms of 
corporate, contract and consumer accountability predominate over an 
increasingly deregulated, deprofessionalized public sector. The sum effect of 
these processes is an audit culture driven by managerial conceptions of 
performativity, efficiency and value for money (see Jones 2010). Undercutting 
these trends, however, are recent government policy and research documents 
alluding to a shift towards a postneoliberal policy consensus, one that 
undermines rather than lionizes a neoclassical economic view of the individual 
as homo economicus. The umbrella term used to capture this emerging policy 
consensus is ‘libertarian paternalism.’ Libertarian (or soft) paternalism is a style 
of welfare and economic policy making first imagined by Colin Camerer and 
Samuel Issacharoff (see Camerer et al. 2003) and later made popular by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein through the now familiar nomenclature of 
‘nudge’ (see Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
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Predicated on the belief that not all individuals share the capacity to calculate 
the expected benefits and costs of their actions, the philosophy of libertarian 
paternalism sets out to rewrite the neoliberal narrative on individual behavior 
by insisting that individuals need to be educated into making decisions that 
best reflect their welfare and self-interest (see Epstein 2006, Loewenstein and 
Haisley 2008). At the heart of the concept of ‘nudge’ is the idea that individuals 
(citizens, consumers, employees, clients, etc.) often behave irrationally. On this 
understanding people typically fail to optimize the utility of their decision-
making in ways that are commensurate with rational outcomes (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). In recent times the British coalition government has flagged 
this issue through mobilizing insights from behavioral psychology, 
neurobiology, neuroeconomics, social cognition and preference theory, among 
other disciplines, to inform policy development and practice. In 2010 the 
coalition government set up a specialist unit within the Cabinet Office (better 
known as the ‘Nudge Unit’) by way of demonstrating its commitment to the 
application of ‘nudge’ tactics to its repertoire of policy technologies (see 
Cabinet Office 2011). To this end, it has coopted the publication of various 
policy and research texts promoting the use of soft forms of state power to 
nudge citizens into behaving responsibly and rationally (see Darnton 2008, 
Knott et al. 2008, GCN 2009, Dolan et al. 2010). 
 
In fact, the earliest adoption of light hand regulation in the UK can be traced to 
a 2004 Cabinet Office report in which the authors (Halpern et al. 2004) 
outlined the poten-tial of using soft compulsion methods to influence behavior 
change across policy sites as diverse as employment, health, crime and 
education (also see DEFRA 2007). Crucially, the report outlines methods by 
which ‘government acting as a more effective “persuader” can be squared with 
an agenda of enhanced personal responsibility – helping people to help 
themselves’ (Halpern et al. 2004, p. 4). Later in 2005 the practice of nudging 
reared its head again in a report on pensions written by Lord Turner (DWP 
2006). Observing that most individuals lack the time and capacity required to 
fully comprehend the information on pensions, Lord Turner proposed the 
introduction of a favorable default option (the ‘automatic opt-in’) to ensure all 
workers are enrolled on the National Pensions Saving Scheme (NPSS). In the 
case of the automatic opt-in, individuals are perceived to be locked into 
behaviors characterized by myopia (or short-termism) that undermine the 
long-term practice of calculating the potential costs and benefits of different 
actions (Loewenstein 1996). Automatically enrolling employees on pension 
schemes is therefore legitimated on the grounds that it promotes the welfare 
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of those people who might ordinarily lack the foresight and utility to correctly 
judge the long-term benefits offered by pensions. 
 
Nudging thus forms part of a broad range of governmental practices aimed at 
inducing better self-care and self-responsibility. It can refer to ‘any aspect of 
the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 6). Specific 
examples of nudging also include the deployment of emotional registers (or 
‘warm words’) in environmental campaign material (Ereaut and Segnit 2006), 
presumably to create better ethical citizens. Others include the creation of 
specially designed spatial environments that make use of social marketing 
techniques including product placement to induce responsible and healthy 
eating (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). As Dolan et al. (2010) explain: ‘[b]ehaviour 
change is often seen as government intruding into issues that should be the 
domain of personal responsibility. However, it is possible for government just 
to supply the trigger or support for individuals to take greater personal 
responsibility’ (p. 10). Libertarian paternalism thus seeks to produce ‘policies 
that maintain or increase freedom of choice’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 5) 
while at the same time generating a greater role for the state in shaping the 
impulsive behaviors of presumably less rational individuals. Before moving on 
to a discussion of the implications of these ideas and practices for policy and 
popular understandings of emotion, I want to briefly explore the relationship 
between libertarian paternalism and neoliberalism since it is, I want to argue, a 
complimentary and mutually transformative one. 
 
Embedding neoliberalism 
 
As Thaler and Sunstein explain, ‘[a] choice architect has the responsibility for 
organizing the context in which people make decisions’ (2008, p. 3). A choice 
architect there-fore is someone who makes solid the practice of nudging 
citizens (consumers, clients, or even employees) into making choices that best 
reflect their welfare and self-interest. This usually takes place through making 
available information, advice and guidance that might otherwise enable 
(‘empower’) citizens to make rational decisions. Although not for-mally 
recognized as ‘choice architects,’ local authorities across the UK since 2006 
have appointed individuals to assist parents with the handling and preparation 
of their school choice (what are collectively known as ‘choice advisers’) (DCSF 
2006). In many ways school choice represents the policy translation of 
7 
 
neoliberal ideas in the field of education policy development and practice 
(Wilkins 2010). Introduced through the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA), 
school choice assigns obligations and responsibilities to parents as consumers 
with the freedom to exit their local school system. Parents may therefore 
select a school for their child on the basis of personal preference, taste, or the 
perceived needs of the child, rather than be forced to accept the school place 
allocated to their child by the local authority (the standard school allocation 
procedure practiced until 1988). Echoing public choice perspectives at the time 
(Downs 1967, Niskanen 1973) – the central idea being that ‘economic theories 
of decision-making can be applied to non-market choices’ (Finlayson 2003, p. 
29) – school choice articulates a conception of parents as rational utility 
maximizers. It reflects attempts to naturalize a narrow rational, utilitarian view 
of parents as self-interested, calculating and competitive subjects. When we 
consider that the role of libertarian paternalism is to develop culturally-
attuned forms of welfare policy making – ‘the integration of cultural, 
regulatory and individual change’, according to Dolan et al. (2010, p. 13) – 
‘choice advisers’ can be viewed as agents linking parents with preferred 
neoliberal forms of user engagement in the realm of education. 
 
The inability or unwillingness of parents to choose a school for their child has 
therefore not been overlooked by governments. Rather it has been a focus of 
policy intervention since New Labour set out to create service users who are 
‘better-informed customers’ (Ministers of State 2004, para. 3.4.3). Specifically 
designed to target and nudge those parents who ‘find the system difficult to 
understand and therefore difficult to operate in the best interests of the child’, 
or who are simply ‘unable or unwilling to engage with the process’ (DCSF 2006, 
p. 2), choice advisers work to ensure parents adjust to politically mandated 
norms through inducing their active enlistment as informed and discriminating 
subjects. Specifically, people who take control of existing educational 
opportunities and plan for the future welfare of their child. Libertarian 
paternalism thus is suggestive of a logic of governing in which market values 
are not simply extended and disseminated to all institutions and social action 
(Brown 2005) but which are also embedded through a process of socializing 
individuals to adapt to the risks and demands late capitalism generates. From 
this perspective, libertarian paternalism performs a valuable function in 
reconstituting the viability and survival of neoliberal ideas and practices. It 
works to ensure the state continues to act as a ‘commodifying agent,’ 
‘recalibrating institutions [and individuals] in an attempt to make them 
homological with the firm and amenable to the processes of the “market 
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form”’ (Ball 2009, p. 97). This, I want to argue, has serious implications for 
policy translations of emotion since the dominant discourse of libertarian 
paternalism relegates emotion to something automated and unreflexive. In 
what follows I will sketch out the repertoires and formulations underpinning 
this idea of emotion before concluding the article with an outline a discursive 
psychology approach to emotion. Such an approach is pertinent to 
problematizing existing policy (mis)understandings of emotional thinking and 
feeling. 
 
Emotion as lack (or tact) 
 
As I have already demonstrated, libertarian paternalism belies the dominant 
economic assumption that social actors are entirely rational and even, in some 
cases, cognizant of their own preferences (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Echoing 
an advanced liberal or neoliberal approach to welfare governance, it supports 
a view of human behavior as defined by the pursuit and satisfaction of 
preferences, but refutes the idea that those preferences are always 
deliberative, rational and logically consistent. Viewed from this perspective, 
libertarian paternalism (while imposing little or no cost on the sovereign 
character of the fully rational consumer) is, notionally, anti-Hayekian. The 
insistence that less rational individuals need to be nudged to ensure they act in 
their own self-interest disrupts any notion of the self as a central controlling 
agency of psychic and moral life. To be more precise, it under-mines the 
ontological privilege traditionally ascribed to market conceptions of freedom 
and behavior by classical liberalism (Gray 1995). Within classical liberalism, 
individuals are defined as moral and calculating agents best placed to make 
judgments about their own welfare and consumption patterns. But human 
response is flawed by nature, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) claim, because it is 
predetermined by systematic biases which are psychologically ingrained. For 
Thaler and Sunstein, careful planning of the physical environment is one way in 
which unconscious decision-making can be compensated for. Using the 
example of door handles, Thaler and Sunstein observe: ‘[f]lat plates say “push 
me” and big handles say “pull me”, so don’t expect people to push big handles! 
This is a failure of architecture to accommodate basic principles of human 
psychology’ (2008, p. 90). 
 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) also consider emotion to constitute a barrier 
preventing individuals from fully maximizing their potential as rational utility 
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maximizers. This is an idea which has gained scientific credibility in 
neurobiology studies and the study of brain processes. From the perspective of 
neurobiology, emotional responses are triggered by the anterior insula region 
of the brain. This is a part of brain judged to be ‘ancient’ compared to the 
prefrontal region of the brain thought to modulate or restrain irrational drives 
(Lowenstein 1996, Gazzaniga 1998, Shiv et al. 2005). The suggestion here is 
that physiology dictates human response and individuals by nature are slaves 
to visceral drives (you are irrational because of your brain chemistry or lack of 
control over it, which needs nudging towards more rational ends) (Damasio 
1994, Le Doux 1996). Cast in the role of physiological dupes, neurobiology 
positions humans as predictably err and therefore failing to maximize the 
utility of their decision-making in rationally superior ways. Similarly, for Thaler 
and Sunstein there are limits that prevent humans from making consistently 
rational decisions. These limits include time, cognitive or computational ability, 
availability of information and emotional drives stemming from the dynamics 
of unconscious brain processes. To illustrate this point, Thaler and Sunstein 
distinguish between two types of behavior which they align with properties of 
an ‘Automatic System’ and a ‘Reflective System’ (2008, p. 21). The former 
highlights behaviors judged to be rapid, instinctual and ‘unconscious’ (2008, p. 
21) (e.g., beyond contemplation) while the latter characterizes behaviors 
considered to be rule-bound, deductive and logical. 
 
One of the dangers here is that government identified ‘bad behaviors’ – what 
Dolan et al. (2010, p. 12) pinpoint as ‘people vandalising cars, stealing our 
possessions, and threatening our children’ – run the risk of becoming discretely 
politicized at the same moment they are depoliticized through the ‘neutral’ 
language of evidence-based science. This is not to say that such behaviors are 
morally defensible. They are not and should be treated as serious crimes. But 
the presentation of neuroscience-based explanations of ‘bad behaviors’ as 
manifestations of an inbuilt, automated, bodily response – in other words, 
something purely neurologically instantiated – is problematic. For one thing, it 
raises polit-ical, ethical and epistemological concerns relating to the status or 
validity of knowledge – what constitutes knowledge – and the authority of 
‘experts.’ Consider for example the deprofessionalization of education and 
teaching in England since the 1980s. Schools are no longer driven by the 
expertise of professionals – practitioners for example. Rather they are 
governed at a distance by a narrow rational, technical conception of good 
governance that relies on target-setting, testing and external inspection. 
Knowledge is power; or better still, those who decide what constitutes 
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knowledge get to exercise the most power. To dis-cuss these issues at length 
would be to engage in topics that unfortunately extend beyond the scope of 
this article. Suffice it is to say, there is a large literature spanning diverse 
disciplines across the social, health and political sciences that draw attention to 
similar issues around the impact of evidence-based practice on the work 
performed by professionals, practitioners and policy-makers in the public 
services, from education (Clegg 2005) and health (Wall 2008) to social care 
(Webb 2001). 
 
Implicit therefore to the governmental program of libertarian paternalism is 
the bifur-cation of the rational and the emotional. A corollary of this is that 
particular sites, relations and practices become the target of government 
intervention. As Pykett (2012, p. 222) observes, ‘[p]eople who are not expert in 
managing their emotions, by implication, need the government to manage 
their emotions for them – by affective arrangements, support for mental short-
cuts and education and training for the more reflexive aspects of the brain.’ In 
this framing emotion is thought to occlude the successful performance of a 
rational position because it is judged to result from the irrational desire for 
immediate (as opposed to deferred, more rational forms of) gratification 
(Loewenstein 1996). Striving for a maximum position therefore entails the 
suspension or moderation of emotion to complement the performance of its 
supposed opposite: rational forms of behavior (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 
22; also see Brafman and Brafman 2009, Gladwell 2005). In fact, the history of 
Western thought is replete with examples of this dualist thinking. Plato 
imagined the body to be inhabited by a human soul or psyche composed of 
reason but who was constantly battling the wild and erratic temptations 
elicited through emotional impulses, for example (see Lyons 1980). As Edwards 
(1999, p. 272) highlights, contemporary formsof professional and lay 
psychology continue to shore up similar definitions of emotion as ‘natural 
bodily experiences and expressions, older than language, irrational and 
subjective, unconscious rather than deliberative, genuine rather than artificial, 
feelings rather than thoughts’. These tendencies sometimes give rise to static 
and fixed ideas about the motivations or unconscious desires underpinning the 
lived experience of emotional and rational behavior. As illustrated in Table 1, 
cognitive psychology and neurobiology approaches typically generate 
dichotomies to classify and counterpose the emotional and the rational (also 
see Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 21). 
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Pykett (2012) offers a similar observation when she describes how soft forms 
of state power legitimate and reproduce a view of emotion as bodily 
dependent or elements in the formation of intuitive and embodied responses 
far removed from rational modes of reflec-tion and deduction. A corollary of 
this, Pykett warns, is that libertarian paternalism is likely to further entrench 
gender inequalities since emotion is often gendered as a feminized prac-tice. 
Challenging this ‘false dualism’, Pykett calls attention instead to the ways in 
which emotion can be understood to be recursively generated and rendered 
culturally intelligible through contexts which are locally indexed and culturally 
mediated. Such an approach is important for relocating the ‘social’ in our 
analyses of emotion (see Harré 1986) and, potentially, disentangling the false 
conflation of emotion with unreflexive and irrational modes of communication 
and decision making. 
 
In a similar critical vein, I want to conclude this article by deploying elements of 
a discursive psychology approach with the aim of problematizing any 
straightforward definition of emotion as unreflexive and automated. Unlike 
psychoanalytic theory, which uses methods of free association and 
transference to trace the interior states and processes framing emotional 
dynamics (see Frosh 1999, Gough 2004), a discursive psychology approach 
seeks to demonstrate the ways in which emotion is negotiated and practiced in 
and through talk and interaction. (In some cases, researchers have creatively 
pursued conceptual analytic models that combine discursive psychology and 
psychoanalytic theorizing, sometimes referred to as psychosocial approaches; 
see Walkerdine et al. 2001 and Froggett 2002.) Discursive psychology aims to 
link the use of emotive discourse to ways of accounting for the self and the 
sociolinguistic activity of affirming or validating particular constructions of 
reality (see Wetherell 1998). A useful description of this method is offered by 
Edwards (1999, p. 278) who suggests that emotion can be analyzed as a ‘way 
of talking’, as a discourse in use and as a discursive device for positioning the 
self through talk. Using similar recursive logic, Wetherell introduces the 
concept of ‘affective practice’ to denote ‘a figuration where body possibilities 
and routines become recruited or entangled together with meaning-making 
and with other social and material figurations’ (2012, p. 19). In both instances, 
emotion can be usefully conceptualized in relational terms as inextricably 
linked with the productive power and constraining effects of discursive and 
semiotic flows and assemblages. In what follows I take up this approach 
through a brief look at the meaning and practice of school choice and highlight 
some of the ways in which emotion can be read as functioning as a discourse 
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much in the same way that formal rationality does – it makes available a set of 
familiar tropes, formulations and repertoires to be used in the negotiation of 
meanings and practices of personal responsibility. 
 
Emotion as sense making 
 
As highlighted by British media commentary, parents regularly experience 
‘stress’ (BBC 2004) when summoned to select a secondary school for their 
child, and go on to experience even further stress if the child is denied their 
school preference (Jamieson 2008). For parents who elect to appeal the 
decision of the school not to grant their child a place, this can mean presenting 
their case to an independent panel consisting of voluntary members of the 
public who uphold or dismiss an appeal on the basis of evidence, justice and 
legislation. To increase the chances of a successful appeal, parents are 
encouraged to familiarize themselves with the formal staging of the appeal 
process and its socially approved forms of interaction. This places a strong 
demand on the professional and lawful conduct of all those involved, including 
the parent. With money and the right social contacts permitting, some parents 
may choose to hire professional consultants to prepare and handle the 
paperwork. They may even solicit the help of friends and family with a 
background in legal casework and terminology. In any case, the one constant 
for all parents engaging in the appeal process concerns avoiding expressions or 
language deemed to be too emotional. As some professional consultants and 
education commentators observe, parents tend to be highly ‘emotionally 
involved’ in the appeal process because of the direct impact it has on the 
welfare of the child (Rooney 2007, p. 60). An unsuccessful appeal can result in 
the parent being forced to send their child to a different school for example. 
This gives rise to parental fears and anxieties about what it means to be 
‘responsible’ and ‘good’ (see Wilkins 2010 for an examination of these issues). 
The phenomena of fraudulent school applications (e.g., applications in which 
the parent has deliberately set out to defraud the local authority of a school 
place, usually by claiming to live in a house close to their school of choice) 
(Shepard 2008) illustrates clearly the kinds of lengths to which some parents 
commit in order to mitigate any potential risk or uncertainty. This growing 
phenomena is most evident in urban areas where popular schools tend to be 
oversubscribed, leading one local authority in 2008 to investigate an alleged 
fraudulent school application using the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000 (RIPA) (powers usually reserved for, among other things, uncovering 
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suspected terrorist activity) (Schlesinger 2008). While the appeal process 
shares some of the uncertainty of the school choice process, parents are told 
they can improve their chances of a successful appeal by managing their 
emotion. As ex-chief school inspector Christopher Woodhead warns, it is 
critical that parents abandon ‘vague emotional arguments’ in order to 
strengthen their case (Woodhead cited in Blinkhorn and Griffiths 2008). In the 
same vein, Rooney discourages parents from pursing ‘emotional attacks’ on 
schools and to instead ‘stick to the facts’ (2007, p. 38). 
 
In this framing emotion is troubled as something potentially wild and 
corrupting to the extent that it undermines the requirement that parents 
engage with logical forms of persuasion (e.g., contemplative and rule-bound). 
Parents therefore are invited to suppress hot passion in favor of cool reason 
(another example of how the emotional and the rational are differently 
legitimated within the constraining effects of discourses and their artifacts). 
The process of school choice gives rise to a similar set of tensions and 
oppositions. For those parents who feel anxious or uncertain about how to 
navigate the school system, the government website Directgov offers a range 
of information and advice on choosing a school, from how to discern between 
different ‘types of school’ to how to evaluate and make use of ‘test results and 
Ofsted reports’ (see section choosing a school). But when discussing the 
motivations and fantasies underpinning their school choice, some parents 
willingly engage in speech patterns of subordinating consumerist logics to 
emotional sensibilities (see Wilkins 2013). Evident in the way some parents 
narrate their experience of choosing a secondary school, for example, is 
depreciation and even suspicion of the use-fulness of league table data as 
criteria for judging whether a school is right for their child. This is not to say 
that all parents refuse the utility of league table data as a basis for their choice. 
Rather, parents will invariably graft and patch together a plurality of 
rationalities and vocabularies (citizen and consumer, community and 
individual, public and private; see Wilkins 2010) on which to base their choice. 
Parents therefore engage with multiple frameworks of choosing. These 
frameworks vary from the generic and objectively defined (e.g., government 
data on schools) to sensations or feelings held to be personal to the parent or 
experientially bound up with the perceived needs of the child. In terms of 
describing and validating the usefulness of these combined approaches, 
parents perform a great deal of communicative care and tact through their 
speech, juggling seemingly contradictory and conflicting impulses. Choice is a 
patchwork of social circulating discourses. At the same time, parents often 
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delineate between approaches as sets of separate and incompatible 
frameworks in terms of the value and utility they make possible. 
 
On the one hand there is the clinical gaze of the consumer whose myopic focus 
is government-approved assessments of ‘output’ and ‘quality.’ This approach 
relies on parents engaging with instrumental form of reasoning that make use 
of what Ball and Vincent (1998, p. 380) describe in their study of school choice 
as ‘cold knowledge’. It therefore can be closely approximated to a consumer or 
market orientation to choice. Yet for many parents the reifying mechanisms of 
the market apparatus fall short of engaging with the ‘needs’ and personality of 
the child, to the extent that some parents denounce economic rationalizations 
of choice as impersonal, detached and decontextualized. Against this 
approach, some mothers engage in forms of emotional labor whereby they 
descriptively build up an image of their child as distinctive, inimitable and 
highly personalized. This has the rhetorical effect of producing two opposed 
frameworks of choosing: one constructed on the basis of the pressures and 
demands of the market, with its insistence on the calculation and extraction of 
probabilities, and the other linked with the concrete and lived practice of 
experientially knowing and engaging with the ‘needs’ of the child. Emotive 
discourse can therefore be usefully described as ‘purposeful assemblies of 
versions of reality and cognition’ (Edwards 1999, p. 271). It provides a set of 
familiar repertoires and formulations to be used in the communicative act of 
garnering support and legitimation for alternative rationalities and 
vocabularies not conventionally captured through economic models of 
decision making. Some parents will deploy elements of an emotive discourse in 
order to affirm a view of the market apparatus as abstract, generic and 
alienating, for example. Parents therefore knowingly and reflexively make use 
of emotion categories and emotion ideas in order to index a notion of 
responsible parenting through forms of meaning-making not conventionally 
captured through the clinical practice of economical utility. From this 
perspective, emotion can be understood to constitute a powerful rhetorical 
ploy for constructing alternative forms of reasoning based on the social or 
moral treatment of human need; as part of a cultural or gender repertoire; or 
as a condition for subverting the apparatus of economic rationalization itself. 
  
Conclusion 
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In this article I have charted the rise of libertarian paternalism in the context of 
British policy discourse and hinted at the ongoing development of neoliberal 
ideas and practices as embedded within the framework of these emerging 
governmental rationalities and philosophies. In addition I have sketched how 
government initiatives aimed at creating better informed consumers 
reproduce neurobiology understandings of the emotional and the rational as 
diametrically opposed. Against this approach I have employed a discursive 
psychology approach in order to problematize existing policy 
(mis)understandings of the emotional as automated or unreflexive. Of course, 
this is not the first time experts have sought to mobilize public policy to 
mitigate the effects of perceived irrational behavior. Lippmanan (1922) and 
Bernay (1923), who both sat on US committee on Public Information and 
shared a deep suspicion of the ‘masses,’ proposed as far as back as the 1920s 
that social and psychological research should be utilized in the interests of 
disciplining the chaotic impulses of individuals. Operationalizing an ‘elite/mass 
view of society,’ McGuigan (2009, pp. 104–105) notes the ways in which these 
propaganda and market experts sought to ‘manipulate artfully the irrational 
impulses of ordinary people’ through the availability of new media 
technologies. This highlights how social marketing, technology and social and 
psychological research are sometimes assembled in ways that seek to create 
disciplined subjects who are amenable to systems of governance and 
governing practices. It also alludes to the power, fear and anxiety underpinning 
the notion of the irrational and its uneasy relationship with preferred forms of 
rational or cerebral behavior. But emotion is not necessarily an inbuilt and 
automated response to objects, relations, or people in the world. It is also 
generative of new ways of thinking and feeling. Emotion is recruited and 
entangled with normative practices of meaning making and of positioning the 
self and others. Policy-makers and practitioners may therefore be well advised 
to think more critically about what emotive discourse aims to achieve in 
certain contexts. This means rethinking neurobiology definitions of the 
emotional and the rational as simply conflicting phenomena, and instead 
attending to the complex problem of how emotion is not simply the reflex of 
cognitively impaired subjects, but sometimes reflects active and inventive 
attempts to generate alternative forms of reasoning, judgment and evaluation. 
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